南亞觀察導讀｜2026年孟加拉大選在學生運動推翻哈西娜政權後舉行，孟加拉民族主義黨（BNP）大勝。儘管Z世代帶來政治變革，但新興勢力未能鞏固影響，政壇仍回歸家族政治，由拉赫曼及其領導的孟加拉民族主義黨所主導，而政治報復與排斥持續循環地出現在孟加拉，同時，經濟成長放緩、就業不足與財政壓力加劇挑戰。外交上，孟加拉在印度、中國與美國間尋求平衡。整體而言，舊體制韌性仍強，改革成效與政治穩定性仍待觀察。
著｜古拉姆．阿里博士（Dr. Ghulam Ali），澳洲蒙納許大學（Monash University）博士，並在北京大學完成博士後研究。目前為駐臺灣的學者，2011年曾為臺灣獎助學人（Taiwan Fellow）。可聯繫信箱：ghulamali74@yahoo.com。
譯｜南亞觀察。
政治背景與過渡期
2026年2月12日孟加拉舉行了第13屆全國大選，這是在2024年7月起義後的首次選舉，過程大致和平。根據選舉結果，299個席次中，由塔里克．拉赫曼（Tarique Rahman）領導的孟加拉民族主義黨及其盟友贏得了212席；伊斯蘭大會黨（Jamaat-e-Islami）及其盟友則獲得77席。與此同時，由學生運動發起，並與伊斯蘭大會黨結盟的新興政黨「國家公民黨」（NCP），僅獲得6個席次。選民在投票當天也針對憲法改革的《7月憲章》（July Charter）進行了公投，並以壓倒性票數通過。
孟加拉的國會「國民議會（Jatiya Sangsad）」共有350個席次，其中300席由直接選舉產生1，其餘50席則為女性保留席次，根據各政黨在普選中獲得的比例進行分配。回顧過去，上屆大選（2024年1月7日）曾遭到孟加拉民族主義黨抵制，而伊斯蘭大會黨當時被禁止參選。
隨後在2024年8月，一場由學生與Z世代領導的強大街頭運動，迫使執政超過15年的總理謝赫．哈西娜（Sheikh Hasina）辭職並流亡印度，終結了人民聯盟（Awami League）的統治。在諾貝爾獎得主穆罕默德．尤努斯（Muhammad Yunus）領導的過渡臨時政府下，採取了3項關鍵措施：
- 解除禁令：取消對伊斯蘭大會黨的參選限制。
- 禁止前執政黨參選：以大規模侵犯人權與恐怖主義指控為由，禁止人民聯盟參加2026年大選。
- 推動修憲：引入《7月憲章》，並獲得68%的選民支持。未來政府必須據此重新平衡總統、總理與國會之間的權力。
這場由學生運動引發的劇烈變革，不僅終結了哈希納長達 15 年的威權統治，更與斯里蘭卡（2022）及尼泊爾（2026）的抗爭潮交相輝映，激發出一股由Z世代打造「新孟加拉」與「政治新黎明」的樂觀浪潮。然而，根深蒂固的家族政治結構，加上日益嚴峻的地緣政治挑戰，正告誡著人們保持冷靜：真正的問題在於，這一切究竟是否真的代表了實質的改變？
革命的現實
儘管Z世代運動推翻了哈西娜的長期統治，並在南亞引發了一波變革浪潮（如早前2022年的斯里蘭卡，與2026年的尼泊爾）。但專家警告，孟加拉深層的「家族政治」結構依然穩固。雖然學生領袖主導了這波政治變革，但他們很快就被邊緣化，政壇重新回到了這些政治老手與家族的手中。
尤努斯的顧問團中僅有2名學生領袖，而新興的國家公民黨也因組織脆弱、內部爭議以及與宗教政黨結盟引起了世俗青年選民的反彈，未能轉化街頭力量為政治實力。
家族政治的延續
目前的發展顯示，孟加拉並未真正擺脫「家族政治」。
預計出任總理的塔里克．拉赫曼（Tarique Rahman）是前總理卡莉達．齊亞（Khaleda Zia）與前總統齊亞．拉赫曼（Ziaur Rahman）之子。他在流亡英國17年後於2025年底回國繼承黨魁。外界質疑他主要是依靠家族世襲而非個人政治實力，且長年旅居國外可能使其脫離國內現實。
政治排斥與迫害
孟加拉的政治環境正經歷變化，但排擠並迫害政治對手的慣例似乎不減反增。過去人民聯盟執政時，曾在 2014、2018 與 2024 年多次禁止伊斯蘭大會黨參選。為了報復，人民聯盟還翻出 1971 年獨立戰爭時的老帳，指控該黨與巴基斯坦勾結，並處決了其最高層幹部。
當時流亡海外的塔里克．拉赫曼也遭到起訴，而他的母親卡莉達．齊亞在 2024 年學生運動期間正因貪污罪入獄。直到尤努斯接掌臨時政府後，才撤銷了對他們的指控。然而隨著局勢反轉，尤努斯臨時政府也開始用相類似的政治手法對付人民聯盟，起訴了大量基層黨員。最令人震驚的是對前總理哈希納（Hasina）進行缺席審判，並判處死刑。這些舉動表明，孟加拉的政治報復循環依然在重演。
經濟挑戰
孟加拉目前面臨經濟成長趨緩（2025 年預計為3.7%），通膨持續居高不下，以及由國際貨幣基金組織（IMF）支持的緊縮調整措施。在就業方面，職位創造的速度嚴重落後於龐大的青年人口增長（Youth Bulge）：2016年至2022年間，雖有1,400 萬青年達到勞動年齡，但僅創造了870萬個職位，且多數受限於低生產力的工作。同時，長期低迷的賦稅佔國內生產毛額比率（tax-to-GDP ratio）（約6%至7%）限制了財政空間，導致龐大的發展需求面臨資金短缺。
外交政策挑戰
在哈希納下臺後，孟加拉在區域情勢下的外交政策發生了顯著轉向。過去人民聯盟長期與印度保持親密關係；在哈希納執政的15年間，她深化了與新德里的國防與安全聯繫，甚至在2017年簽署了首份國防協議。然而，這樣的互動關係使的印度被抨擊過度干預孟加拉主權及政治，孟加拉政府也遭致對印度過於依賴的批評，而這也正是學生運動中部分群體所表達的不滿訴求之一。
另一方面，孟加拉民族主義黨在傳統上較為親巴基斯坦。在尤努斯臨時政府期間，孟加拉與巴基斯坦進行了前所未有的和解，包括恢復直接貿易，並計畫在多年後首次重啟直飛航班及放寬簽證。與此同時，哈希納在印度的政治庇護以及新德里拒絕引渡要求的立場，成為達卡與新德里關係的額外磨擦點，並加劇了孟加拉國內日益高漲的反印情緒。
事實上，基於地理與經濟因素，孟加拉無法脫離印度的影響。此外，孟加拉還必須應對日益激化的中、美競爭：達卡在投資、經濟成長與基礎建設上日益依賴中國，同時在外交支持與安全領域則仰賴華盛頓。
Z 世代的起義與舊體制的韌性
孟加拉的「Z世代起義」雖然推翻了舊政權，但未能成功轉化為一股足以打破「孟加拉民族主義黨與人民聯盟」2黨長期壟斷局面的政治力量。新當選的領導人，也是可能的總理人選—塔里克．拉赫曼，其地位多半源於家族世襲制度。由於其脫離現狀基層，且缺乏國家治理的實務考驗，使他是否能成為落實孟加拉青年所渴望之「深層結構性改革」的合適人選，備足受外界質疑。
此外，由於禁止大型政黨之一的人民聯盟參選，這所產生的「政治真空（Political Vacuum）」已經損害了孟加拉的政治多元性。這可能導致數百萬名人民聯盟支持者對新秩序產生不認同感，並可能在未來中期埋下新一輪動盪與社會極化的種子。 真正的考驗才正要開始：在未來的數月—甚至數週內—將會見證孟加拉的新政治格局，是否真能將此一政局斷裂的轉捩點，轉化為具有意義的實質成果與改革。
原文
Bangladesh’s ‘New Dawn’ or Old Duopoly? Gen Z, Dynasties and a Fragile Transition
By Ghulam Ali
On 12 February 2026, Bangladesh held its 13th mostly peaceful national elections, the first since the July 2024 uprising.
According to the results, out of 299 seats contested, the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), led by Tarique Rahman, and its allies won 212 seats, while Jamaat-e-Islami and its allies secured 77 seats. The nascent National Citizen Party (NCP), which emerged from the student movement and formed an electoral alliance with Jamaat-e-Islami, could secure only six seats.
Simultaneously, Bangladeshi voters also participated in the referendum on the ‘July Charter’ for constitutional reforms and overwhelmingly approved it.
Bangladesh’s unicameral Jatiya Sangsad has 350 seats. Of these, 300 are directly elected, while 50 are reserved for women and allocatedbased on proportional representation among parties in parliament after the general election results. In 2026, the election was postponed in one seat due to the death of a candidate and will take place later.
Bangladesh’s last general elections were held on 7 January 2024, which were boycotted by the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), while Jamaat-e-Islamiwas barred from contesting.
A powerful student and Gen-Z-led street movement forced Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina to resign and flee to India in August 2024, ending over 15 years of Awami League rule. An early election was subsequently held in February 2026 in the wake of these dramatic events. An interim government under Nobel laureate Muhammad Yunus was established, which adopted several significant measures, three of which were particularly consequential.
First, the interim government lifted the ban on Jamaat-e-Islami which was barred from contesting the 2014, 2018, and 2024 elections by the Awami League. Second, it banned the Awami League from contesting the 2026 polls on the grounds of alleged mass human rights abuses and terrorism-related offenses during its time in power. Third, to meet protestors’ demands, it introduced a comprehensive ‘July Charter’ package of constitutional, electoral, and institutional reforms and put it to a nationwide referendum for approval.
According to the referendum results, about 68 percent of participating voters pressed ‘yes.’ Consequently, the next government will be required to implement the ‘July Charter’, which will amend the Constitution to rebalance powers between the president, prime minister, and parliament.
The student movement’s dramatic overthrow of Hasina’s 15-year entrenched rule in Bangladesh, seen alongside protest-driven changes in Sri Lanka (2022) and Nepal (2026), generated a wave of euphoria about a New Bangladesh made by Gen Z, and a ‘new dawn’ of a transformed political order. However, deep structural factors of dynastic politics and mounting regional and geopolitical challenges caution against such euphoria. The bigger question is whether it represents a change in the first place.
Revolution Grounded
Although a Gen-Z-led student movement, rather than traditional parties like the BNP or Jamaat-e-Islami, drove the change, its leaders were quickly sidelined, allowing the familiar old guard to return.
The post-Hasina interim government under Yunus included only two student leaders from the mass movement in his council of advisers.
Furthermore, in the highly dynastic and patronage-driven party system, the student leadership failed to channel its street power into a substantial political force. The NCP quickly encountered organizational weaknesses, leadership disputes, and strategic missteps, and its alliance with Jamaat‑e‑Islami sparked a revolt among cadres for betraying its secular, youth‑driven image.
Perpetuation of Dynastic Politics
Recent political developments in Bangladesh reflect the perpetuation of long-standing dynastic politics rather than any real break that the student movement had aspired to.
Tarique Rahman, who leads the BNP and is expected to be the next Prime Minister, is the son of former Prime Minister Khaleda Zia and former President and military ruler Ziaur Rahman. In December 2025, he returned to Bangladesh after 17 years of self-exile in the UK. Soon after, following his mother’s death, he was confirmed as the head of the BNP.
Tarique is leading the BNP primarily by virtue of dynastic succession rather than demonstrated personal political merit. Moreover, his seventeen years of comfortable life in the UK more likely distanced him from Bangladesh’s ground realities.
Political Exclusion and Victimization
In Bangladesh’s evolving political setup, the repeated trend of exclusion and victimization of political opponents continues rather than decreases. During its grip on power, the Awami League banned Jamaat-e-Islami from contesting elections in 2014, 2018, and 2024. More to its revenge, the Awami League also revived decade-old issues regarding Jamaat-e-Islami’s alleged collaboration with Pakistan during the 1971 Liberation War and prosecuted and executed its top leadership.
The Awami League also prosecuted Tarique Rahman while he was in self-exile. His mother, Khaleda Zia, was serving a multi-year prison sentence on corruption charges at the time of the student movement in 2024. The interim government of Yunus released them from these charges.
Then, the pendulum swung to the other side. The interim government of Yunus prosecuted a large number of Awami League workers in a familiar political manner. Most notably, it tried Hasina in absentia and handed down a death penalty. These measures are in no way a departure from the past.
Economic Challenges
Bangladesh faces slowing growth (3.7 percent for 2025), stubbornly high inflation, and a tightening IMF-backed adjustment. Job creation lags badly behind its youth bulge: between 2016 and 2022, 14 million youth entered working age, but only 8.7 million jobs were created, with many confined to low-productivity work. At the same time, a chronically low tax-to-GDP ratio of around 6-7 percent constrains fiscal space and leaves large development needs unfunded.
Foreign Policy Challenges
Bangladeshi foreign policy in the regional context shifted markedly after Hasina’s ouster. The Awami League had remained close to India, and during her 15 years in power, Hasina deepened defense and security ties especially signing the first ever defense agreement with New Delhi in 2017. India’s perceived over-influence and Dhaka’s dependence on it were among the grievances voiced by sections of the student movement.
On the other hand, the BNP has traditionally been more Pakistan-leaning in its regional outlook. During the Yunus interim government, Bangladesh made an unprecedented rapprochement with Pakistan, with direct trade resuming and plans for direct flights and easier visas moving forward for the first time in many years. At the same time, Hasina’s political asylum in India and Delhi’s refusal to extradite her became an additional irritant in Dhaka-New Delhi relations and fueled rising anti-India sentiment.
In reality, for geographic and economic reasons, Bangladesh has no escape from India.
Bangladesh also has to navigate the intensifying rivalry between the US and China. Dhaka is increasingly dependent on China for investments, economic growth, and infrastructure, while also relying on Washington for diplomatic support and security.
Gen‑Z’s Uprising, System’s Resilience
Bangladesh’s Gen-Z uprising toppled the government but failed to become a political force capable of breaking the BNP-Awami League duopoly. Tarique Rahman, the newly elected leader and likely candidate for prime minister, is elevated by dynastic entitlement, detached from ground realities, and untested in national governance, making him a questionable vehicle for the deep structural changes that Bangladesh’s youth demand.
Moreover, the political vacuum created by banning one of the largest parties, the Awami League, has undermined pluralism. It risks delegitimizing the new order in the eyes of millions of its supporters, and may sow the seeds of renewed instability and polarization in the medium term.
The real test begins now: in the coming months—perhaps even weeks—it will become evident whether the new setup in Bangladesh can translate this moment of rupture into meaningful delivery and reform.
編者按
- 2026年的選舉鐘，之所以之有299席次由人民直選，在於孟加拉北部謝爾布爾（Sherpur District）的一個選區中，有候選人在投票前逝世，因此推遲投標日程。 ↩︎
本文圖片來源｜Photo by Bornil Amin on Unsplash
